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An Answer: The Advisory Council On Nov. 26, the ADA charged Johnson with loss of Texas to Eisenhower. The Dallas News reported: ” ‘Johnson had complete charge in Texas,’ said the ADA in its current publication, the ADA World. . . . “What work Johnson did for Adlai Stevenson was ‘nothing more than a clever pretense,’ the ADA said. “Johnson was asked: “1.Why did he pitch the campaign emphasis so heavily to the rural vote while virtually neglecting the campaigns in the cities? “2.Why did he all but conceal from Texas voters the fact that Adlai Stevenson was his party’s presidential candidate? “3.Why did he pass over those who helped to lead the fight in 1952 in selecting local campaign chairmen and leaders in 1956 who had displayed so little enthusiasm for either Stevenson or the Democratic Party? “4.Why was no discernible effort made to counteract the heavy defection of Negro voters from the Democratic ticket? . . . ” ‘After several unsuccessful find some prominent businessman or lawyer who would agree to head the Dallas campaign, one Pat Coon was chosen,’ the ADA said. ” ‘Thereafter Coon spent only one day at his office in the Dallas ‘Stevenson-Kefauver campaign headquarters. His one burst of activity came ten days before election, when he decided to have some Stevenson car stickers printed, only to discover it was then too late!’ ” The executive committee of the Democratic National Committee on Nov. 27 took the action necessary to amalgamate the leadership of the party by setting up an Advisory Council to formulate party policy and shape a legislative program. Paul Butler later explained that it was ” . . . quite generally considered the party had not filled the true role of an opposition party from 1952 up to the presidential campaign. It will be different from now on,” he declared, “if the advisory group has its way.” On Dec. 5 Butler announced the membership of the Advisory Council. Eleven members of Congress, a majority, and only nine others were named. On Dec. 8, Rayburn wrote Butler he and three of his House leaders would not accept the invitation to join DAC. Johnson, also refusing to participate, said the Council “would only cause delays and confusion.” On Dec. 13, William S. White wrote in The Times: “Democratic congressional leaders have destroyed a movement by party liberals to put the national organization directly into legislative planning for the new Congress. The advisory body proposed for this purpose . . . will not function effectively and probably will never meet.” Butler calmly announced the first meeting of the council. Senators Kefauver and Humphrey and Congresswoman Green accepted appointment along with Truman, Mrs. Roosevelt, and Mayor Tucker. Adlai Stevenson had already agreed to serve. Filibuster Saved The 1956 Democratic platform had again urged majority rule in the Senate. On the opening day of the new Congress, Senator Clinton Anderson of New Mexico, for himself and 30 other senators, including Humphrey and Symington, offered a motion in effect to let THE TEXAS OBSERVER Page 6 April 15, 1960 the Senate adopt new rules. Johnson -,himself moved to table Anderson’s motion. Nixon clearly put himself on the side of those who wished to change the rules. He held that the right of “a current majority of the Senate” to adopt Senate rules cannot be limited by rules adopted in a previous session. Only an hour before the vote came, the Democratic Advisory Council endorsed a new filibuster limitation. When the vote came, the motion to table carried 55 to 38, with Humphrey, Kennedy, and Symington voting against the Johnson motion. Though Kennedy had voted against the Johnson motion to table, he had not joined Humphrey and Symington in sponsoring the Anderson motion. On Jan. 8 Kennedy was given the coveted seat on the Senate foreign relations committee by the steering committee over the seniority of Sen. Kefauver. Not only had Johnson fought Kefauver’s nomination for the vice presidency at Chicago and supported. Kennedy, Kefauver had accepted the assignment on theDAC. Johnson juggled the seniority rule to suit his predilections, urbanely announcing the steering committee action was unanimous. Howard Shuman, legislative assistant to Sen. Douglas, wrote scathingly in The New Republic: “The consequences of this system are disastrous for liberal senators. If they behave, accept the system and do not upset party unitya euphemism, in the case of Democrats, for doing nothing to offend the Souththey will be fed a few political crumbs. If they fight a bold and lonely battle, the seniority system by some mysterious process becomes less sacred when applied to them.” Johnson’s favorite saying comes from Isaiah: “Come, now, let us reason together.” What he neglects to add follows in the verse: “If ye be willing and obedient, ye shall eat the good of the land: But if ye refuse and rebel, ye shall be devoured with the sword.” Former Senator Herbert Lehman of New York spoke out on. Jan. 18. Lehman charged: “In my judgment, by hindsight, the election of 1956 was lost before the campaign began .. . the mistakes that really hurt were mistakes made in Congress during the three-and-a-h a 1 f -year period from the beginning of 1953 until the summer of 1956. . . . The Democrats in Congress failed to make the issues during the eighteen months we were in control. On the contrary, almost everything the leadership did chiring that time was designed to prevent any controversial issue from being seriously joined or vigorously debated. On the two main issues of our times–civil rights and foreign policythere was a virtual blackout.” January was a trying time for Democrats. Eisenhower’s State of the Union Message was greeted by Republican Sen. Aiken \(Vernot likely to excite much comment or controversy.” And what did Democratic Party Leader Johnson say about the same speech? ” . . . a comprehensive and thoughtful analysis.” Butler moved forward to a resounding vote of confidence from the Democratic National Committee in San Francisco Feb. 15. The committee passed one resolution expressing “complete confidence” in Butler and then gave the DAC the power to formulate party policy between conventions. The National Committee said it resolved to assume “leadership in formulating and enunciating programs.” The DAC, so backed by the committee, proceeded to act. First it issued a statement on foreign policy concluding with criticism of the Administration’s proposed Middle East Doctrine. Second it recommended statehood for Hawaii and Alaska. Third it urged Democratic members of Congress to enact pending legislation “to eliminate discriminations of all kinds in relation to the right to vote and to engage in gainful occupations; and the other specific discriminations mentioned in the planks on civil rights embodied in Democratic platforms.” No ‘Giveaway? The Middle East Doctrine had been proposed by Eisenhower in his message to Congress. S.J.R. 19 was introduced in the Senate to implement the President’s request. As tensions increased and demands were heard from all sides for a review of our Middle-East policy, Fulbright demanded a full scale examination of the situation before acting on the resolution. Johnson again accommodated the Administration by giving the “go ahead” signal without waiting for Fulbright’s review. And on April 7 in Palm Beach Johnson demanded an end of “foreign give-aways” and substitution of a program geared to greater reliance on technical assistance plans and loans through the World Bank. He declared that “the budget must be cut and will be cut.” He added that “we must be prudent and we must be careful” in paring foreign outlays, “but justifiable reductions can be made. “We don’t want to be wastrels our foreign or domestic programs,” he asserted. The Advisory Council met on May 5 and issued three statements: on foreign policy, “right to work,” and economics. But Leader Johnson was busy. Indirectly slapping at a monetary investigation Rayburn and Wright Patman wanted, in his May Washington News Letter Johnson told his constituents: “If there is something wrong with our financial structure, we ought to find out what it is. I am glad to say a sweeping inquiry into the subject is going to be conducted by the Senate Finance Committee under the leadership of Senator Harry F. Byrd. “I know of no man better equipped to look into this important matter, one that directly affects all of us. Senator Byrd is wise, his views are sound, his integrity is beyond question.” The Battle of the Budget waged in Congress had violent repercussions country wide. Time, June 3, reported: “. . . the Johnson-Rayburn emphasis on budget cutting means hacking away at programs for which the national Democratic Party has long stood. .. . “Much of the bitterness is directed at Senate Leader Lyndon Johnson himself. Says Pennsylvania’s Democratic State Chairman Joseph Barr: ‘I see great danger and distress signals in the spectacle of a man like Lyndon Johnson trying to lead the Democratic Party away from its traditional principles.’ Says Oregon’s Governor Robert Holmes: ‘The Democratic Party goes forward when it remembers it is a liberal party, and I could wish Senator Johnson would remember that our party dares be the liberal voice of America.’ Says Colorado’s influential Eugene Cervi, editor and publisher of Cervi’s Rocky Mountain Journal and one time Democratic state chairman: ‘As far as Lyndon Johnson is concerned, he is outmoded, out of date, out of step, out of philosophy, and has almost taken himself out of the Democratic Party.’ ” D.A.C. Pressure Pays The House rules committee finally voted out the Administra tion’s 1957 civil rights bill. The Southerners worked to. amend the bill to add a jury trial provision. Long-established law and practice made no provision for a jury in contempt actions growing out of violations of court orders where the federal government was a party to the suit. On June 18, Congressman Poff offered a motion to recommit the civil rights bill \(HR. ment would be added. The motion lost, 158-251. With Rayburn not voting, every other Texas Democratic congressman voted to recommit to add the amendment. Tied in with the Senate vote on the civil rights bill was some fast and fancy footwork in the cloakroom by Leader Johnson. On June 21, the next day after the civil rights bill was placed on the Senate Calendar, the Senate considered the bill for federal construction of one high, multi-purpose dam at Hell’s Canyon. This bill failed in 1956 in the Senate by six votes. But on June 21, 1957, it’ passed 43-38, with five Southerners who had voted against it in 1956 voting for it in 1957. Word was out that Johnson had traded Southern votes for Hell’s Canyon in exchange for Western votes for the jury trial amendment. The Senate debate on the civil rights bill had gone on two weeks when the first crucial vote came on eliminating Part III, which would have provided means of implementing the guarantees in the 14th Amendment to the Constitution. On July 24 Johnson closed the debate to eliminate Part III by saying it would provide “new and drastic and far-reaching enforcement procedures to cover a wide variety of vaguely defined socalled civil rights.” Part III was eliminated, 52-38, Johnson voting to eliminate; Humphrey, Kennedy, and Symington voting against. On Aug. 2 the jury trial amendment defeated in the House was offered in the Senate. The amendment was added, 51-42, with Johnson and Kennedy voting yes, Humphrey and Symington no. The pressure of the Advisory Council was beginning to be felt. The first day they met and is-sued statements they had urged Congress to pass a civil rights bill. The voting rights bill wasn’t much of a “civil rights” bill, but at least the pressure on Johnson was such that he had to deliver something. This was the minimum. Johnson had carved the House bill down to a “vote bill” and tied the jury procedure around its enforcement provision. For a few minutes following Johnson’s adroit maneuver, Eisenhower acted like a President. He issued the sharpest statement he had ever made about a congressional vote, saying: “No American can fail to feel the utmost concern that an attempt should be made to interpose a jury trial between a federal judge’ and his legal orders. During our history as a nation great Americans have pointed out that such a procedure would weaken our whole judicial system. . .. In this case it will also make largely ineffective the basic purpose of the bill that of protecting promptly and effectively every American in his right to vote.” But the valedictory epitaph was added by Johnson’s mentor Russell. Sen. Russell slily commented: “This bill is not going to work any hardship on the people of Georgia.” On Aug. 15 Alan Cranston, president of the California Democratic Council, said: “. . . Senator Johnson of Texas should resign as Senate majority leader. If the Democrats were led in the Senate by a man who would fight for what most Democrats want, the civil rights of millions of Americans would not be protected.” Newsweek, Sept. 9, reviewed the record of the Congress in terms of Ike’s programwhat he asked for, what he got. The striking items were the whack in the defense budget and foreign aid. The President’s request for defense had been $38.4 billion. Congress voted $35.2 billion, a cut of $3.2 billion. The President’s request for foreign aid had been $4.4 billion. Congress voted $2.8 billion, a cut of $1.6 billion. The President had also asked for $3 billion for labor, health, education and welfare Congress voted $2.9 billion, a cut of $100 million. In view of Johnson’s April 7 speech at Palm Beach it is interesting to note that in the slash of foreign aid, Congress cut Eisenhower’s request for $500 million for a development loan fund to $300 million. ‘Watchdog’ Johnson The fall of ’57 could well be called the season of Johnson’s discontent, for October brought the “Bleep-Bleep” of Russia’s first satellite. And who was chairman of the Senate Armed Services “Watch-Dog” Sub-Committee? Johnson. On July 31, 1950, Johnson had stated at the first meeting of his sub-committee: “Our assigned task is clearly defined in the resolution adopted unanimously by the full committee. We are asked to exercise both a continuous watchfulness and a continuous study of “all policies, programs, activities, operations, facilities, requirements, and practices’ of the Department of Defense, the armed services, and other agencies dealing with the national security in general and