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indeed, most of them are not even democracies. And in fact, the AFL-CIO collected endorsements from more than one hundred labor and human rights organizations in developing countries, all calling for a labor standards agreement. As William Greider observed in The Nation, it’s Western corporations and Third World elites that have a confluence of interest in maintaining a repressed, low-wage workforce. Not Third World workers and their bosses. And there is no consensus on the benefits of foreign investment for working people in the developing world. As Sarah Anderson, John Cavanagh, and Thea Lee point out in an excellent December 6 Nation piece called “Ten Myths About Globalization,” although foreign investment has brought higher wages in some countries, without labor protections there is no guarantee that this will be the case. In Mexico, they point out, direct U.S. investment jumped from $16.9 billion to $25.3 billion under the first four years of NAFTA, yet real manufacturing wages fell 23 percent. Meanwhile, as globalization has gained momentum over the last twenty years, income gaps in most developing countries have gotten wider, and the gap between the industrial and the developing world has tripled. In the alternative press, the discussions centered inevitably on the implications of organized labor teaming up with American environmentqlists the new “dream team” of old-line Democrats with such thrilling results. As you might expect, observers found what they wanted to find here. Marc Cooper of The Nation, who has covered the labor movement since the dawn of time \(or at least much sought after progressive coalition an American version of a red-green alliance.” Cockburn derided this as liberal mythmaking, lumping Cooper in with Michael Moore, Jim Hightower, and Molly Ivins, as the guilty parties still chasing the dream of a Democratic party rejuvenated by its traditionally progressive left core constituencies. Had big labor really been down for the cause, Cockburn argues, it would have brought the troops, all 30,000 of them, right into the fracas in front of the convention center, instead of steering them away from the battle. But, as reported in the Times and elsewhere, Clinton had apparently persuaded AFL-CIO President John Sweeney to refrain from direct action, in exchange for a promise to press for a labor standards agreement, which Clinton did, albeit disingenuously late in the game, and with a predictable result: utter failure. Cockburn’s charge is reminiscent of that leveled at Martin Luther King, Jr. in 1966. King was set to lead his marchers into the all-white Chicago suburb of Cicero and certain physical harm but called off the march at the last minute in exchange for a promise from Mayor Daley to “study” the segregation issue there \(an agreement case, though, Cockburn argues that the influx of fresh troops would have actually prevented violence, by forestalling the imminent police attack on the few thousand direct-action protestors already in place. Cockburn engages in some mythologizing of his own, lauding the bravery of the few hundred union members \(apparently who disobeyed their marshals and joined the protests. This is an anecdote that fits nicely with Cockburn’ s understanding of the U.S. labor movement: a revolution in suspended animation, filled with rank-andfile members just waiting to be radicalized, restrained only by their sold-out leaders. In the pictures from Seattle, one thing is indisputable: the Battle in Seattle was fought, by and large, by young people. For those of us who grew up in the Reagan years, this is something new under the sun. “Kissinger,” from page 9 person outside the government we were authorized to discuss the negotiations with. We trusted him. It is not stretching the truth to say that the Nixon campaign had a secret source within the U.S. negotiating team.” A few days before the election, Vietnamese negotiators indicated a willingness to make concessions in order to get a bombing halt, and President Johnson prepared to give it to them. Kissinger learned about it early enough to give Nixon several hours warning enough time to let Nixon announce that the Democrats were about to “play politics with the war.” It blunted the positive effects of the bombing halt, and Nixon squeaked into office with a plurality of only 42 percent. Kissinger got what he wanted, the job as National Security Advisor in Nixon’s cabinet. But, ironically, Nixon never forgot Kissinger’s treacherous conduct toward the Democrats, and he always harbored doubts about Kissinger. Four years later, when Nixon was preparing for the 1972 election, he worried that if Kissinger quit the administration he might start divulging some of Nixon’s dirty tricks. He said to his chief of staff, Bob Haldeman, “Remember, he came to us in ’68 with tales.” Although Nixon was profoundly influenced by Kissinger’s advice throughout his time in office Nixon seems never to have re ally trusted him, and with good reason. Kissinger had a minimum of loyalty to the President. He was constantly schmoozing with the press in such a way as to downplay Nixon’s role in foreign affairs and embellish his own role. There were times when Kissinger took credit for the entire foreign policy of the Nixon years. Of Nixon’s achievements, the one he was proudest of was in opening relations with China. He was left “white-lipped with anger” on reading Kissinger’s interview with the Italian journalist Oriana Fallaci, in which he ignored Nixon’s paramount role and boasted, “Yes, China has been a very important element in the mechanics of my success. And yet that’s not the main point. The main point, well, yes, I’ll tell you. The main point arises from the fact that I’ve always acted alone. Americans like that immensely. Americans like the cowboy who leads the wagon train by riding ahead alone on his horse…. This amazing, romantic character suits me precisely because to be alone has always been part of my style.” When the interview was published, first in Italy and then in The New Republic, Kissinger denied saying any of it. But Fallaci had interviewed him with a tape recorder. In his off-the-record talks with the press, Kissinger regularly implied that Nixon was somewhat kooky. Nixon, who had his own back channels to the press, knew what was going on, and by 1971 See “Kissinger,” page 21 12 THE TEXAS OBSERVER JANUARY 21, 2000