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ALAN POGUE George Green in front of DHS Centimeter Warehouse other for the foul-ups. In one memo, SPGSC Director of Facilities Construction David Garbade blames Green for poor communication with SPGSC, and DHS for poor interagency communication. \(According to a 1988 story in the Austin American-Statesman, Garbade was fired that year by SPGSC executive director Lias “Bubba” Steen, after Garbade had given documents to the press detailing problems with another state project, the Supreme Court/Attorney Soon after the Dunbar renovation began, Polk County Judge Wayne Baker, who represented the county in the Dunbar arrangement, wrote to SPGSC complaining about sagging boards, defective walls and discrepancies between what the state paid for and what the contractor delivered. Baker’s August 1, 1986 letter to DHS officials also states that when the county presented SPGSC “with information pertaining to alleged extortion, kick backs from suppliers, and bill padding that affects our citizens, your [DHS] offices’ response was ‘so what?’ Regarding the kickbacks, Baker said he had a tape of a conversation in which the contractor was trying to extort kickbacks from a painting company hired as a subcontractor on the project. A DHS memo recounts that DHS officials listened to the tape and heard “what appeared to be highly irregular exchanges of money between [contractor and subcontractor] pertaining to the renovation project.” Judge Baker’s letter goes on to say that the county will no longer accept substandard work from the contractor, and criticized SPGSC’s management of the project. In response to the judge’s allegations, DHS and SPGSC officials acknowledged that the project was rife with problems, but maintained that most of them stemmed from the subcontractors’ poor communication to SPGSC, and slow payments by the county to the contractor. In December 1986, the contractor told DHS and SPGSC the project was “substantially complete.” Judge Baker disagreed. After meeting with SPGSC officials, Baker would not accept the project as substantially completed, because of roof and window leaks, poor workmanship, fire hazards, various defects, and the contractor’s alleged failure to pay subcontractors. “The poor workmanship and cost over-runs evident on the project are the result of poor supervision by State Purchasing and General Services,” Baker wrote to DHS officials. DHS asked SPGSC to investigate, and SPGSC’s wrote Baker that its inspection found the building substantially complete, with only minor defects or mistakes that would be covered in the warranty period. “That’s not true,” Green said. “The problems are of such a substantial scale the roof leaked from the beginning, the doors don’t close, the lighting is insufficient, the air conditioning is unreliable and it has a horrendous electrical bill that the warranty won’t cover them. The building is unhealthy in that it has standing water which has promoted bacteria and mildew growth, water and other contaminants have penetrated the roof system, floors and walls.” Green reported these deficiencies to his supervisors. Nevertheless, DHS’s current management allowed the 10-year roof warranty to be set aside in return for a $13,500 negotiated deal in which the insurance company and the state split the costs of a minimal overhaul. “Current DHS management is spending additional state funds to fix a project that clearly should have been resolved years ago,” Green said. The disputes and repairs dragged on for the next year and a half. In a 1988 inspection, Green found “ponding” of water on the roof, leaks and a multiplicity of other flaws attributable to corner-cutting and poor workmanship. The general contractor had since gone bankrupt. Green reported his findings to John Griffin, DHS’s assistant administrator for regional business services. Griffin’s supervisor, DHS’s Hopkins in turn wrote to SPGSC’s David Garbade, saying that he, Hopkins, was “becoming extremely concerned and uneasy about the direction and management of the [Livingston] project.” THE TEXAS OBSERVER 9