ustxtxb_obs_1982_04_23_50_00020-00000_000.pdf

A Public Service Message from the American Income Life Insurance Co.Waco, TexasBernard Rapoport, Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer ning. Peacemaking as we have experienced it is not just high drama. It’s a lot of drudgery. Sometimes low drudgery. We thought we had the peace treaty terms all hammered out at Camp David. But it took several months of detailed legal negotiation at the Madison Hotel in Washington, at what came to be called humorously by the participants “Camp Madison.” It took an abortive second meeting at Camp David in the snow, called Camp David II, of not so blessed memory. It took a voyage of a President of the United States to Cairo and Jerusalem, and days of more hard bargaining at the summit, to bring us finally to that climatic point March 26,1979, and the signing of the peace treaty the first peace treaty in the history of the Middle East. It was signed on the lawn this time the front lawn of the White House. And many of you, I’m sure, were proud to be there, as were Sallie and I. Across the street that afternoon, if you recall, there was a group chanting PLO slogans. Perhaps it was an omen that although we had achieved peace between these two major exenemies, Egypt and Israel, carrying out the rest of the Camp David agreement would be even harder. Creating a new reality out of the principles of that agreement, bringing to life the idea of a transitional, interim arrangement for the West Bank and Gaza would not be an easy task. Yet it remains the only concept which held then, or holds now, any realistic prospect for making progress on this issue. In May 1979 a different traveling negotiating show began to move around the world. This time is started in Be’ersheva, moved to Giza, then to Herzliya, then to The Hague, then to back to Herzliya and back to Giza. And the next round I suppose will be back in Herzliya. There has been progress on autonomy, a fair amount of it, but no breakthrough. There has also been growing disillusionment, both among the negotiators and, I think, more importantly, among some of the public. But the fundamental reason that disillusionment has grown, I believe, is that no other Arab leader shared Sadat’s vision. He was left alone with Israel and the United States to wrestle with the complexities of the Palestinian issue. There was also, of course, too long a hiatus in the negotiations. Democratic countries have special problems: every few years they have elections and everything else stops. First it stopped here for our elections in 1980; then it stopped in Israel for the first half of 1981. Eventually we reviewed the bidding and got back to the negotiating table only a few weeks ago, still convinced that no better path toward the next step of peace exists. It’s been a weary and frustrating odyssey, particularly this second phase, for all of us involved. And we no longer have Anwar Sadat with us. But there can be no peace for the peacemaker. Either you keep plodding forward or you start slipping back, ultimately toward war. You don’t stand still in the Middle East. Now let me pose a new question. Why is it that as we have made progress toward peace, as the U.S. and Israel have marched down that road together since 1977, we have suffered from frequent wild swings in the public mood, especially in Israel but to some extent here in our own country as well? Why so many misunderstandings? Why so many “crises”? Once again, Eppie Evron has taken some of my lines. He mentioned dependence . . . overdependence, an incongruity in the relationship between our two countries. I think that is an important element. But I would cite some others. First, when peace broke out, there were understandably unreal Israeli expectations about what peace would mean. Israelis have never had peace; they have never enjoyed one day of peace in the entire life of their nation. They looked at other nations at peace like the United States and Canada. “That’s a good model. That’s what it will be like.” Of course it wasn’t. Of course, you don’t wipe away 30 years of hatred overnight. And, of course, Americans and Canadians weren’t quite so chummy in 1813. A second reason, I think, was the great disillusionment after Sadat’s arrival in Jerusalem that his epic trip did not bring total peace with all Israel’s enemies in its wake. Recalling the history of the 1948 armistice negotiations with the several Arab states, Israelis had always believed, with some reason, that Egypt was the key. If Egypt came forward to make peace, surely the others would not be far behind. When they were not, a deep sense of disillusionment set in. The realization dawned that the road was still very long, that the danger from terror and war had not evaporated, that Israeli sons and daughters would have to continue to go to the army and to return for reserve duty every year, and that 31 years of sacrifice and struggle might stretch on into the indefinite future. Thirdly, after the peace came a belated realization that abandonment of Sinai to Egypt meant that, in financial terms, peace would cost more not less. The loss of oil fields, the expenses of relocating military facilities, not fully compensated by the generous but not sufficient aid from the United States, meant that the already hard-pressed Israeli economy would continue to be hard pressed, and perhaps in the short run even more so. So, first, peace with Egypt was not the perfect peace of Israel’s dreams. Second, it did not bring overall peace in its wake. And third, it carried a heavy economic price. But beyond these disappointments, particularly associated with the peace process itself, I think there are some enduring “disconnects” in the U.S.-Israel circuitry which have afflicted our relationship for decades. Paradoxically, they have grown more important as our friendly but arm’s length relationship of the 1950’s has evolved into a close, unwritten alliance in the 1980’s, an unwritten alliance in which the feeling of dependence looms far too large for self respect, dignity, and for tranquility. What are these “disconnects”,in our relationships? I can list several. First, we expect too much of each other as nations and societies. We expect too much of Israel. We Americans look on Israel as a model democracy which should surely follow the values it proclaims. Israel looks on us as an all powerful nation . . . in fact omnipotent. Therefore when we err, Israelis believe we do so by design, not by mistake. Neither of these expectations are realistic; both are deeply held. Second, we have different international roles, responsibilities, and national interests. There’s an old saying that “where you stand depends on where you sit.” If you sit in Jerusalem, you look out on a world with a certain configuration and a certain order of priorities. But if you sit in Washington, Ame rican Income Life Insurance Company EXECUTIVE OFFICES: P.O. BOX 208, WACO, TEXAS 78703, 817-772-3050 BERNARD RAPOPORT Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer 20 APRIL 23, 1982 reowestr*-0. 64C* vmetd0,000.018