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I. F. STONE’S WEEKLY A 60-minute film by Jerry Bruck, Jr., narrated by Tom Wicker Wednesday April 24 Dobie Screen / 21st & Guadalupe Austin showings at 8, 9 and 10 p.m. $5 Donation “A Most Engaging, Moving and Exhilarating FilmDon’t Miss It! Such a thorough delight it left me feeling the way other people said they felt after seeing ‘The Sound of Music.’ That is, quite high.” VINCENT CANBY, The New York Times 0 0 0 Cr 0 z X using present warheads and targeting facilities, it apparently would have to plan to loft four or five missiles in the general direction of Soviet silos to knock them out \(because, it seems, our targeting equipment has been designed to aim at large cities, not attack like that would be as provocative as a first strike at Moscow, what with all those surplus megatons flying around. Ergo, it would result in massive retaliation. Thus a shotgun attack on Soviet ICBM’s is deterred, just as a traditional first strike is deterred, by the present MAD situation. This stalemate has two drawbacks, in the Schlesinger view. It prevents us from knocking off Soviet missiles whenever we like. It also discourages our using any nuclear force except the ultimate one against the Soviet Union. Suppose, Schlesinger seems to be asking, we want to nuke ’em just a little bit? If we had a “counterforce” capability, we could “respond” more selectively, act more “appropriately.” And, at the same time, avoid a doomsday-slinging contest, either by wiping out the Soviet capacity to respond or by keeping our own city-killers in reserve as a deterrent to their city-killers. What Schlesinger seems to be suggesting, then, is a saner brinkmanship, a step away from all the MAD scenarios. What is also involved, though, is a new instability in the nuclear balance. Consider two additional “counterforce” scenarios: In the unlikely event that one great power allows the other to develop the world’s only “counterforce,” both would be tempted to strike first: one because it could wipe out the other’s ICBM’s at reduced risk, the other because its missiles \(and whatever portion of its population lost their deterrent value. Unless the nation with “counterforce” on its side used its advantage to force disarmament, the inherent stability of equal power would be gone. In the event that both powers jumped into a “counterforce” arms race and arrived simultaneously at a point of equal power, the best poSsible outcome would be a new stalemate \(we don’t want to use our Even in the new balance, there would be larger uncertainties: do we really want to launch only our small arms, knowing they may respond with enough “counterforce” to knock out our ICBM’s and with enough large missiles to wipe out our cities? do we really want to respond to this “counterforce” first strike with only our small arms, knowing that their “counterforce” may be more effective than ours and that we may be left with an inferior ICBM force? “Counterforce” has a madness all its own, and not only in the new dimensions of scenario-writing it adds to brinkmanship. The development of such a TEXAS OBSERVER fund raiser featuring… Come early or stay late to meet with Observer editors and readers at NEW YEAR’S EVE, a watering hole located in Dobie Center adjacent to the theatre and lobby. Dobie Screen’s seating capacity is limited; so please write or phone for advance tickets, indicating time of showing preferred. Send your order to The Texas For those who won’t be able to attend the screening and partying the evening of the 24thor those who can’t afford $5, even for a cause as worthy as the ObserverI. F. STONE’S WEEKLY will be shown the afternoon of the 24th at it will begin a regular commercial run at the same location. Information regarding bookings in other areas may be obtained by writing THE I. F. STONE PROJECT, P. 0. Box 315, Franklin Lakes, N.J.. 07417. April 12, 1974 21